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Following an intensive discussion, Germany introduced a nationwide minimum wage on 1 January 2015, which was set at an
hourly wage of € 8.50. Undeniably, there is a significant amount of international and national literature that discusses the
minimum wage, both generally and specifically, in Germany. Counterintuitively, only small, negative employment effects are
identified for the German minimum wage, whereas some international studies (e.g. for the US) even found positive effects.
However, only a few papers focus on different sorts of adjustment channels that firms are applying as a response to the higher
labor costs. This thesis focuses on the analysis of firms’ profitabilities and asks if profit margins significantly declined in highly
affected industries, as a response to the nationwide minimum wage. Therefore, this paper uses a Difference-in-Difference
approach that compares the ratio of pre-tax profits to revenue in industries which are more exposed than their less affected
counterparts. To define the exposure of an industry to the minimum wage, the Structure of Earnings Survey of 2014 is used to
calculate industry specific bite measures. Surprisingly, no significant decrease in firm’s profitability can be found as a response
to the German minimum wage introduction in 2015. This result is consistent over all model specifications that are used in the
underlying thesis.
Keywords: Minimum wage; Germany; difference-in-difference; adjustment channels; profitability; firm-level performance.
1. Introduction
Since Card (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994) analyses
of county minimum wages in New Jersey’s fast-food restau-
rants, which reveal positive employment effects, the classical
thinking about minimum wages changed to include a broader
range of opinions. Before their study, there was a consensus
among economists that a binding minimum wage leads to
negative employment effects. However, further research fo-
cused on the market specifications and concluded that mini-
mum wages can have positive, negative, or no effect on em-
ployment depending on the labor market structure. Many
economists, especially after Card and Krueger (1994) study,
tried to explain their empirical results with theoretic devi-
ations of the standard model. Inevitably, there is no clear
evidence on the different effects of minimum wages, neither
on the empirical side, nor on the theoretical side.
Minimum wage research also expanded to employment,
its related effects, and possible adjustment channels for firms
facing higher labor costs due to the wag floor (e.g. Hirsch,
Kaufman, & Zelenska, 2015). The relevance of these studies
lies in the ambivalence of employment effects. If firms do
not cut jobs but are still confronted with higher labor costs,
they might adjust their behavior in terms of their pricing,
which would mean that consumers pay for the higher wages,
or through lower profits, which would be equivalent to firm
owners paying for an introduction of a minimum wage. Thus,
only considering employment effects when evaluating mini-
mum wage could result in an incomplete analysis of the sit-
uation (Bruttel, Baumann, & Dütsch, 2018).
Prior to 1 January 2015, Germany was one of the few
countries in the European Union without a nationwide mini-
mum wage. This changed after two German political parties,
the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD), agreed on a national wage floor of€ 8.50
per hour. This decision came after an intensive debate, where
many economists feared massive job loss, especially in East-
ern regions of Germany. However, supporters saw a national
minimum wage as a way to promote fair labor practices, cre-
ate a positive distributional effect, and implement an instru-
ment to reduce poverty. In the end, the two primary argu-
ments for wage reform were the increasing gross wage in-
equality in Germany and the decreasing share of the work-
ing population using collective bargaining (Bossler & Gerner,
2016, Bosch, 2015).
In the four years since the German labor market reform,
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many studies focused on the employment effects. Indeed,
these studies only identified small negative employment ef-
fects. Such effects included the significant decrease in the
prevalence in mini jobs, and firms appear to have postponed
their hiring rather than cut full time jobs (Caliendo, Schröder,
& Wittbrodt, 2019). Unfortunately, other adjustment chan-
nels such as a profit decline have not received much attention
in the context of the German minimum wage. Thus, this the-
sis aims to focus on the German minimum wage’s effect on
firms’ profitabilities, which is defined as the ratio of pre-tax
accounting profit to total firm revenue.
The key consideration leading to this analysis is, there-
fore, that higher labor costs are associated with lower profits
if employment does not change. Therefore, it is likely that
firms who do not cut jobs, face a lower profitability because
of the minimum wage if they are unable to shift increased
costs to their consumers through price increases. To iden-
tify a possible effect on firms’ profitability ratios, this paper
applies a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) approach and fol-
lows previous studies in the field of minimum wage research
(e.g. Mayneris, Poncet, & Zhang, 2018, Harasztosi & Lind-
ner, 2019, Draca, Machin, & Van Reenen, 2011). Two differ-
ent datasets will be used: the Special Statistical Publication
of the German Central Bank (2018), which includes the profit
margins on the industry level, and the Structure of Earning
Survey (2014) to compute the affectedness for each industry.
This thesis begins with an introduction into the policy
context in Germany in section 2, and it will focus on key the-
oretical considerations on minimum wages and theoretical
outcomes on firms’ profits in section 3. Part 4 summarizes the
empirical literature on international and national evidence,
whereas section 5 gives an introduction to the data used. This
is followed by a short graphical description of the data in
section 6. A detailed description of the empirical strategy is
given in part 7 and followed by the empirical results and in-
terpretations in section 8. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
section 9.
2. Minimum Wage in Germany: Policy context
After the agreement of the Grand Coalition, consisting of
the SPD and the CDU, a statutory national minimum wage of
€ 8.50 per hour was introduced on January 1, 2015. Prior
to 2015, only sectoral minimum wages existed, such as for
hairdressers and security services (Caliendo, Fedorets, Preuß,
Schröder, & Wittbrodt, 2017). Surprisingly, not all unions
were in favor of the implementation of a national minimum
wage and not all firms were against it. However, employer as-
sociations commonly argued against a nationwide minimum
wage, as they said it would weaken the German system of
collective bargaining. Nevertheless, these cases show the di-
versity of opinions and the divided interests among all actors
in the debate (Bosch, 2015).
Normally, companies in Germany set wages through col-
lective bargaining, where unions negotiate wages with em-
ployer associations freely and without any intervention from
the government. However, the fraction of people covered by
collective bargaining has been decreasing for more than 20
years. One potential reason is the voluntary participation in
the collective bargaining process. Additionally, as collective
bargaining coverage fell, real wages stagnated, and the wage
inequality rose. Combined with the good form of the German
labor market, this potentially influenced the decision to intro-
duce the national statutory minimum wage. Furthermore, it
was the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, herself who liked
the idea of a minimum wage. This was first mentioned by
Merkel in 2013 and led to a conflict with the coalition part-
ner––the German liberal party (FDP)––at that time (Bossler
& Gerner, 2016).
The Minimum Wage Commission (Mindestlohnkommis-
sion, 2016b) proposed further adjustments; on January 1,
2017, the minimum wage increased to€ 8.84 per hour, with
a future increase to € 9.19 in 2019 and € 9.34 by 2020. In
2014, around 5.5 million workers earned less than€ 8.50 per
hour. However, only 4 million of these workers were eligible
for the nationwide minimum wage according to the Federal
Statistics Agency. Most of those who did qualify were work-
ers in the eastern regions of Germany, women, and marginal
employed workers (“minijobbers”) (Destatis, 2016). How-
ever, the introduction of a minimum wage came with many
exceptions, and therefore, not all workers who earn less than
€ 8.50 were eligible. To make finding employment easier,
long-term unemployed persons are allowed to work for the
first six months for a wage that is below€ 8.50. Another no-
table exception includes interns and workers under the age of
18. This exception does not extend to apprenticeship though,
as the Grand Coalition introduced a separate general mini-
mum wage for apprentices of€ 515 per month in May 2019.
This will be effective for new contracts as of January 1, 2020,
even though this only applies to branches where no sectoral
agreements exist (Bundesregierung, 2019).
As of 2019, 22 of the 28 countries in the European Union
have a nationwide minimum wage. The range is quite high,
as can be seen by the stark difference between the Bulgar-
ian minimum wage of € 1.72 per hour compared to Luxem-
burg’s€ 11.97. While the German minimum wage of€ 8.50
falls between these extremes, a further increase of Germany’s
minimum wage is highly discussed (Handelsblatt.com, 2019)
as the current level of € 9.19 is considered as relatively high
(Caliendo et al., 2019).
3. Theoretical Considerations
The following section of this paper will give a short
overview of the most relevant labor market theories, with
a particular focus on the effects of a minimum wage on
market equilibrium.
The oldest and one of the most discussed theories in eco-
nomics is the case of a perfectly competitive market––the
neoclassical theory. In terms of labor markets, this means
that firms and consumers do not have any market power;
thus, the equilibrium wage w∗ and employment level L∗ are
defined through labor demand and labor supply. Introduc-
ing a minimum wage wmin > w
∗ leads to an excess of labor
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supply and, therefore, to unemployment. This can be eas-
ily seen in the simplest economic model: due to an increase
in wages (the price of the product labor), demand for that
product falls as labor demand is a downward sloping func-
tion. Additionally, total output in the economy falls (Kras-
niqi, 2007). The full coverage of all workers by the min-
imum wage is an important underlying assumption in the
neoclassical model. Stigler (1946) argues that unemploy-
ment might not rise when low-wage workers increase their
productivity so that their Marginal Product of Labor (MPL)
is at least as high as the introduced minimum wage (Stigler,
1946; Brown, Gilroy, & Kohen, 1982). In addition, the in-
troduction of a binding minimum wage does not affect the
level of employment. A profit-maximizing firm will increase
their prices in response to the higher labor costs. As a conse-
quence, both the firm’s output and its profit decrease (Neu-
mark & Wascher, 2008). Nonetheless, there are some expan-
sions of the standard model, which allow for partial cover-
age only (e.g. Welch, 1974; Gramlich, 1976) or introduce
the case of a heterogeneous worker-force––namely by distin-
guishing between skilled- and unskilled workers.
However, the result is different if employers have market
power and the labor market is characterized by a monop-
sony. It was Robinson (1933) and Stigler (1946) who first
established this idea. A monopsonistic labor market is char-
acterized by only one employer (monopson) whereas there
are many possible workers. Therefore, the firm is no longer
a price-taker, and thus has market power, at least over the la-
bor market. Such a firm will find a wage wM optimal, which
is smaller than the equilibrium wage w∗ in a perfectly com-
petitive labor market. Firms set their wage optimal when
their marginal cost of labor equals their marginal revenue
product of labor. Similar to the monopoly case, the marginal
cost of labor is higher than the labor supply––easier said, the
marginal cost curve is steeper than the labor supply curve.
Therefore, an introduction of a minimum wage can stimu-
late employment under certain circumstances, namely when
the following equation holds true: wM < wmin ≤ w∗
This is because marginal costs decrease, even if average
costs rise (Robinson, 1933). Nevertheless, a minimum wage
that is set too high clearly predicts the same outcome in the
monopsonist model as the neoclassical does. Furthermore,
Stigler notes that the application of the monopsony model to
labor markets is not “relevant” (Stigler, 1946, p.360). One
reason is that low-wage industries are competitive (Stigler,
1946). Additionally, a firm’s profit stays unchanged in the
monopsony model––compared to the standard neoclassical
model (Neumark & Wascher, 2008
Bhaskar and To (1999) try to simulate the effects of a
minimum wage in a monopsonistic competition model. Con-
trary to the monopsony model, the situation of monopsonis-
tic competition has a large number of employers (firms), and
they can freely enter or exit the market. These employers all
compete with each other for workers. Bhaskar and To (1999)
use horizontal differentiation to allow workers to have differ-
ent preferences on non-wage characteristics to then apply the
spatial model of Salop (1979), which originally stems from
industrial economics, and models the location, the number
of firms, and the prices in equilibrium. If labor markets can
be described as monopsonistic competitive, a minimum wage
leads to a rise in employment in individual firms. However,
some firms will exit due to the negative effect on their profits
because of the wage-setting externality; thus, no clear effect
on aggregate industry employment can be determined in the
long-run, as the number of firms that exit stays ambiguous.
Bhaskar and To (1999) argue a highly distorted labor market
might increase the economy wide employment.
Another well-known theory in labor markets is the so-
called efficiency wage theory, first developed by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). They argue that it can be optimal for firms
to pay a higher wage (efficiency wage) than the compet-
itive market wage to ensure that workers make an effort
and are productive. This model is constructed on the ba-
sic principal-agent problem, which means that firms cannot
control whether workers work efficiently (Shapiro & Stiglitz,
1984). Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) build on that model and
showed that, under certain assumptions, an introduction of
a minimum wage can increase short-term employment in the
context of an efficiency wage model. An increase or an in-
troduction of a minimum wage, which is higher than w∗,
makes a job loss harder. Therefore, the productivity of the
workers increases, and in the context of an efficiency model,
less resources for production oversight are necessary. Con-
sequently, firms can hire additional workers instead of us-
ing their resources to monitor their existing employees. In
the long-term, they show that employment can increase, fall,
or stay unchanged as a consequence of the firm’s long-term
zero economic profit condition. This is due to the decrease
in firms’ profits in their theoretical model. In addition, they
argue, that due to the envelope theorem, a minimum wage
might even be pareto-improving (Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995).
In general, firms’ profits do not change due to the mini-
mum wage in efficiency wage models (Neumark & Wascher,
2008). However, in models where firms do not maximize
their profits, it is even possible to experience an––ceteris
paribus––increase in profitability as a consequence of the
minimum wage. This can be explained with the cost sav-
ing efforts that companies are forced to pursue because of
the higher labor costs and the incentive to operate more
efficiently; thus, there may be a situation where an enter-
prise’s cost savings exceed its higher labor costs (Neumark &
Wascher, 2008).
To sum up the theoretical part of this thesis, the effect of
minimum wages highly depends on the underlying market
structure and the specific assumptions made. However, this
means that there is no consensus about a generic effect of
minimum wages among economists, and therefore, this “is-
sue is best approached empirically through the careful study
of the specifics of particular minimum wage laws and the op-
eration of particular labor markets” (Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995,
p. 254).
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4. Empirical findings so far: Literature overview
In this section, a short description about empirical stud-
ies of the effects of a minimum wage will be given––with a
special focus on, but not limited to, the German minimum
wage.
4.1. Minimum Wage studies: International
Surprisingly, not only are the theoretical aspects and the
possible impacts of a statutory minimum wage highly am-
biguous and not clearly determined, but the empirical re-
search also rarely agrees on a common conclusion. Nonethe-
less, until the work of Card and Krueger (1994) and the rising
New Minimum Wage Research, economists mainly supported
the concept of minimum wage causing a disemployment ef-
fect. This is especially due to the review of the existing re-
search so far by Brown et al. (1982), where they study the lit-
erature concerning a minimum wage in the US. Brown et al.
(1982) find disemployment effects, though they emphasized
the rather small consequence, mainly for teenagers or the
youth. Additionally, they identified an elasticity of teenage
employment with respect to the minimum wage of -0.1 to
-0.3; thus, it can be concluded that a 10% increase in the
minimum wage leads to a reduction in total teenage employ-
ment by 1-3% (Brown et al., 1982).
However, since the work of Card and Krueger (1994);
Card and Krueger (1995); Card and Krueger (2000), some
economists now challenge the traditional neoclassic under-
standing of minimum wages and labor markets. Card &
Krueger, 1994 analyze the effect of the increase of New Jer-
sey’s minimum wage in 1992 from $4.25 to $5.05. For that
purpose, they survey 410 fast-food restaurants in New Jer-
sey and the neighboring state of Pennsylvania before and af-
ter this increase. They were the first to apply the method of a
difference-in-difference estimation that uses a regional varia-
tion in the affectedness to the study of minimum wage effects
(Caliendo et al., 2019). To illustrate, they compare the differ-
ence in employment between New Jersey and Pennsylvania
before and after the exogeneous rise in New Jerseys binding
minimum wage. The result was revolutionary. They not only
found no significant disemployment effects for New Jersey’s
fast-food restaurants relative to their neighboring state, but
they also found slightly positive employment effects. As com-
pared to restaurants in Pennsylvania, employment in New
Jersey rose by 13% (Card & Krueger, 1994; Card & Krueger,
1995; Schmitt, 2013). Neumark and Wascher (2000) reply to
Card and Krueger (1994) evaluation of New Jersey’s higher
minimum wage by using payroll data. They find significant
negative employment effects and conclude by emphasizing
the consistence of their results with the general labor market
theories that predict a decrease in employment––especially
for workers at the end of the wage distribution (Neumark &
Wascher, 2000).
In contrast to Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994),
Card and Krueger (1995) and to Neumark and Wascher
(2000), Michl (2000) argues that both can be right due
to rescheduling. That’s because Card and Krueger (1994)
define employment as the total number of workers, an in-
creasing value, whereas Neumark and Wascher (2000) ana-
lyze payroll data and define employment as the total payroll
hours, a decreasing value. According to the rescheduling
model of Michl (2000), a decrease in weekly hours is consis-
tent with a small, though not significant, rise in total workers.
Summing up, workers are better off after the minimum wage
since the increase in wages exceedes the decline in working
hours (Michl, 2000). Other recent studies stress the im-
portance of a proper design of the control group, and thus,
many analyses lead to different and often contradictorily
results due to differences in the applied method. Namely,
the disemployment effects might be a consequence of an
omitted variable bias, which means that some studies fail to
control for effects which influence the underlying dependent
variable (Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2010). When controlling
for spatial heterogeneity in employment growth, Dube et al.
(2010) cannot find any employment effects as a consequence
of the minimum wage. Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011)
support that finding by controlling for long-term growth dif-
ferences among states and heterogenous economic shades.
Their study emphasizes the non-existence of negative em-
ployment effects; instead, they explain that earlier studies
with negative results use biased and non-robust estimators
(Allegretto et al., 2011).
Even though there are numerous studies focusing on the
employment effects of minimum wages, there is a lack of re-
search that deals with other possible adjustment channels.
Firms’ profits are one such channel. Draca et al. (2011) ana-
lyze the effect on a firm’s profitability after the introduction
of a nationwide minimum wage in the United Kingdom (UK)
in 1999. To perform these studies, the authors look at two
different datasets. On the one hand, they analyze the home
care sector, where they expect a rather significant effect. On
the other hand, the authors look at accounting data from a
subsample of all firms that are registered in the UK. They
then compare firms’ profit margins––both highly affected as
well as non-affected––before and after the introduction of the
minimum wage. In the home care sector, firms’ profit mar-
gins, defined as the ratio of profit to revenue, decreased by
23%. Whereas in the sector wide data, the average profit
margin decreased in the range of 7.8% to 10.7%. However,
they were not able to find evidence for a higher probability
of market exit or a higher productivity due to the minimum
wage (Draca et al., 2011).
In addition, study by Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) ana-
lyzes the increase in Hungaria’s minimum wage in 2001––fo-
cusing on several possible adjustment channels such as prices
and firms profitabilities. They use a difference-in-difference
approach to compare both a firm’s behavior towards highly
affected establishments as well as the behavior of their less-
affected counterparts. In line with several other studies,
their analysis could only identify a small negative effect on
employment; however, they also saw a large wage increase
of approximately 50%1. Most interestingly, Harasztosi and
1Only workers who did not lose their jobs had on average a wage increase
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Lindner (2019) concluded that nearly 80% of employee wage
increases is paid by the consumers through higher prices. The
remaining 20% pay the firm’s owners through lower profits2
due to higher labor costs. Consequently, the increase in the
Hungarian minimum wage has a stronger effect on industries
that cannot easily adjust their prices as a response to higher
costs. To be more precise, the profit decline of 0.7% in a
firm’s sales in 2000, in the short-term, is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Regardless, the profit decline of 0.7%
only relates to firms highly affected by the minimum wage in-
crease. The long-term effect was actually much weaker. Ha-
rasztosi and Linder conclude their research by noting that the
minimum wage increase in Hungary is paid by consumers,
and thus their study mainly excludes the adjustment channel
through lower firm profits. By combining their key results,
such as no strong disemployment effects, higher prices, and
no stark decline in firm’s profitability, they raise the ques-
tion of whether a minimum wage can therefore redistribute
income from consumers (who now pay higher prices) to low-
wage employees.
Mayneris et al. (2018) studied the large increase to min-
imum wages in China in 2004––especially with regards to
firms’ adjustments behavior. For this purpose, Mayneris et
al. (2018) use balance sheet data from the National Bureau
of Statistics as well as the China Labor Net dataset for in-
formation dealing with the level of various minimum wages.
Mayneris et al. (2018) then compare the results of both ex-
posed and non-exposed firms before and after the minimum
wage reform. A firm is considered exposed if the average
wage is below the local minimum wage. Their results are in
line with former studies in many regards, but their findings
also present key contradictions. At first, they identify a sig-
nificant wage increase in exposed firms, but there is no effect
on employment. These results are in line with several other
papers (e.g. Harasztosi & Lindner, 2019, Draca et al., 2011).
In contrast to that, Mayneris et al. (2018) do not only identify
no change in firms’ profits, but they also detect a significant
increase in firms’ productivity. Unlike Draca et al. (2011),
Mayneris et al. (2018) research finds a greater probability
for market exit in highly affected firms. Thus, Mayneris et al.
(2018) argue that firms adjust for the higher labor costs with
higher productivity, therefore, the level of employment and
the firm’s profitability does not change. This higher produc-
tivity is mostly explained by better inventory management
and an increasing capital-labor ratio (Mayneris et al., 2018).
The results might be driven by the specific characteristics
of China, given that it is not a fully developed country and
the large improvement in productivity might be especially
relevant for similar-developing economies (Mayneris et al.,
2018). Consequently, these findings need to be interpreted
very carefully, as their argumentation channel will probably
not hold for every industrialized country.
of 50%
2Here profits are defined as the following accounting number: Earnings
before Iterests and Taxes (EBIT)
4.2. Minimum Wage studies: Germany
Bossler and Gerner (2016) were the first to analyze the ef-
fect of the German nationwide minimum wage. They apply a
Difference-in-Difference approach on the firm level. Namely,
they look at highly affected firms (the treatment group) and
compare the results with less-affected establishments (the
control group). Their paper finds a decrease in employment
of 1.9% in affected firms and implies a small negative elas-
ticity with respect to wages.
Garloff (2016) uses regional differences of the effect (the
bite) of a minimum wage to analyze employment. In his
study, he detects a significant negative effect on marginal em-
ployment (“mini jobs”). Nonetheless, Garloff (2016) identi-
fies a significant positive effect on employment for socially in-
sured jobs. Therefore, employment structure changes, which
is in line with Vom Berge and Weber (2017), who also find a
decrease in the number of mini jobs. To illustrate, between
150,000 and 200,000 mini jobs were lost due to the min-
imum wage (Schmitz, 2017). Therefore, claim to identify
a restructuring process on the labor market from marginal
employment to jobs with social insurance. Though, many
studies find evidence for a decline of mini jobs or a rise in
employment (e.g. Garloff, 2016, Schmitz, 2017, Bruckmeier
& Becker, 2018, Vom Berge & Weber, 2017, Holtemöller &
Pohle, 2017), not all academics find causal evidence that this
change was induced by the minimum wage. Holtemöller
and Pohle (2017) do not support––according to the results
of their analysis––the argumentation of a minimum wage in-
duced changed in the labor market.
Some analyses find that the German minimum wage
led to a decrease in (contractual) working hours and an
increase in low-wage workers’ hourly wages (Caliendo et
al., 2017, Caliendo, Fedorets, & Schröder, 2018, Bonin et
al., 2018, Bossler & Gerner, 2016). Nevertheless, Caliendo
et al. (2017), Caliendo et al., 2018) could not identify any
significant effect on low-wage workers’ monthly salaries. An-
other recent paper uses differences in the regional bite of the
minimum wage and then applies a Difference-in-Difference
approach. It finds that an increase in the regional bite by
1 percentage point leads to a 0.5% higher growth in hourly
wages at the lower end of the wage distribution (Ahlfeldt,
Roth, & Seidel, 2018). However, most studies only identify
modest employment effects and find nearly no negative ef-
fects. Others emphasize firms’ strategy to decrease hiring
instead of directly cutting jobs in the short-run. Therefore,
the studies mostly associate the negative employment with
a lower growth in employment (Bossler & Gerner, 2016,
Bossler et al., 2018).
Counter intuitively, Bruckmeier and Becker (2018) ar-
gue that there is no minimum wage induced change of the
probability to find a job for the unemployed. Before the in-
troduction of the minimum wage, many opponents argued
that a wage floor would disadvantage the unemployed, as
their qualifications do not match the relatively high minimum
wage of € 8.50. According to another paper, there might
even be a potential increase in the reservation wages of un-
employed persons (Fedorets & Filatov, 2018).
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Many studies fail to identify significant negative employ-
ment effects. However, as firms’ labor costs increase, compa-
nies will adjust their behavior. A possible adjustment channel
is to increase prices; Link (2019) shows that affected firms in
Germany increase their prices more frequently compared to
their less-affected counterparts. However, this result is not
entirely limited to low-wage industries. Interestingly, firm
adjustment through higher prices questions the description
of the German labor market as a monopsony (Link, 2019).
Bossler et al. (2018) use data from the Institute for Employ-
ment research (henceforth: IAB) to analyze the effects of the
introduced German minimum wage on the firm level to iden-
tify certain adjustment channels of German firms. They use
data from 2011 to 2016 to look at possible effects on produc-
tivity or profitability. In their study, productivity is measured
with revenue and the numbers of employees; easier said rev-
enue per worker is looked at. However, Bossler et al. (2018)
cannot find a significant difference in productivity between
highly affected and less-affected firms. Nevertheless, they
show that more exposed firms to the minimum wage have
a ca. 2% higher probability to make accounting losses than
their non-affected counterparts. Additionally, they identify
a significant, though a rather weak, effect of the minimum
wage on a firm’s profitability due to the higher labor costs.
Nonetheless, Bossler et al. (2018) were not able to find clear
evidence for differences in firm closures.
5. Data description
In the underlying thesis, two different datasets will be
used. The first dataset is the Special Statistical Publication
Number 6 (henceforth: SSP) of the German Central Bank
(Statistische Sonderveröffentlichung 6, Deutsche Bundes-
bank). It contains ratios of financial statements of German
enterprises. This study is used to derive the profit margins
of its reflected sectors at the aggregated level. The profit
margin here is defined as the ratio of Pre-tax profit (Earn-
ings before Taxes; EBT) to total revenue. In 2016, the SSP
contained data of 116,000 balance sheets. However, the
dataset itself does not contain all 116,000 financial reports
to avoid an influence on the data due to a sample effect.
Therefore, only 83,000 balance sheets are used to analyze
firms’ financial statements. The data provided by the Ger-
man Central Bank clearly faces some pitfalls that should be
considered––especially when drawing conclusions from the
results. First, it contains financial accounting statements of
many large corporations, but Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME) are underrepresented. For example, firms with an
overall revenue higher than € 50 million make 86% of the
dataset compared to 64% of the statistical population ac-
cording to the German business register. This could present
a problem, as small and medium sized firms are typically
more affected by a nationwide minimum wage compared
to large, multinational corporations. Second, no good com-
parison of West and East Germany3 is possible due to a lack
of specific results for the East, as the dataset inadequate re-
gional industry records to get representative results. Finally,
relying on accounting data is always risky, as some results
may possibly reflect a change in a company’s accounting pol-
icy or might be the result of certain tax improving actions.
To account for that, pre-tax profits (EBT) will be used in this
thesis (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018).
Nevertheless, the German Central Bank’s SSP reveals
some benefits as well. Namely, the SSP follows the WZ in-
dustry classification (2008) of the Federal Statistics Agency
(FSA) (Destatis, 2008). Additionally, it provides relative
ratios with a high degree of details regarding sub-sector clas-
sifications. The use of ratios instead of absolute values will
give more representative results, as ratios are not affected
by macroeconomic factors such as inflation. Furthermore,
considering only an absolute increase in profits reveals no in-
formation concerning the company’s profitability. Therefore,
the use of a profitability ratio may probably show more real-
istic results. The second dataset is the Structure of Earnings
Survey SES (Verdienststrukturerhebung VSE) of Germany’s
Federal Statistics Agency from 2014. This statistic contains
survey data about individual earnings. It takes place every
4 years, is compulsory, and contains data from 60,000 firms
and 1,000,000 employees in 2014. In addition, the SES fol-
lows the WZ industry classification of 2008 as well (Destatis,
2019). This thesis uses calculated bites of the German min-
imum wage in the different industries. These bites were
calculated using the Structure of Earnings Survey dataset.
6. Summary statistics
This section gives a short overview over the empirical
statistics of the SSP dataset which was introduced in section
5. Figure 1 shows the development of firms’ profit margins4
over four years prior to and two years following the introduc-
tion of Germany’s minimum wage. The graph illustrates the
average profit margins, aggregated on the industry level. By
looking at 2015, the main year of interest, a clear decline in
profit margins compared to the year 2014 can be seen. This
is the strongest decline for the time period of 2010 to 2017.
Nevertheless, there has been a decline from 2012 to 2013,
where no minimum wage was introduced. Additionally, the
level of profitability in 2015 is still at a higher level, approx-
imately 5.0%, than in the years 2010 to 2013. Furthermore,
profit margins increase for the post-reform years 2016 and
2017. Figure 2 gives a deeper insight into the differences
of exposed and non-exposed industries’ profit margins. This
graph uses the binary definition of the bite, which means that
an industry is considered exposed if its bite exceeds the av-
erage share of eligible workers (approximately 10.9%). The
3Note that the terms West and East Germany refer to the former national
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (West) and the German Demo-
cratic Republic (East) until 1990.
4Profit margin as Earnings before Tax to total Revenue ratio (in percent-
ages)
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Figure 1: Industry’s profit margin development
Figure 2: Exposed vs. non exposed industries profit margin development
orange line represents the profit margins of firms in exposed
industries, and the blue line provides information regarding
the non-exposed industries. Similar to Figure 1, there is a
clear decline in profitability for both groups in 2015. How-
ever, the expectation that firms in exposed industries face a
stronger decline is not met. Indeed, the level of exposed and
non-exposed profitability is nearly the same for 2015. Only
the further development for the years 2016 and 2017 shows
a smaller increase in profitability in exposed firms compared
to those which are not affected by the labor market reform of
2015. For the years 2013 and 2014, both groups were on a
common trend as their profit margins nearly equal each other,
though there are small differences from 2010 to 2012. Fur-
thermore, Figure 2 illustrates that since the minimum wage
reform, both groups have developed with a greater disper-
sion than before.
7. Empirical Strategy
7.1. General Strategy: The Difference-in-Difference ap-
proach
Due to the difficulty in exploring the effect on firms’ pre-
tax profit to revenue margins that can be causally interpreted
as a result of the minimum wage, this analysis applies a quasi-
experiment approach. The Difference-in-Difference (DiD)
approach compares firms profits in highly affected industries
with their less-affected counterparts before and after the in-
troduction of the German nationwide minimum wage. Thus,
this analysis relies on defining a treatment group, that in-
cludes industries which are highly exposed to a minimum
wage, and a control group, that includes industries which
are not at all or only slightly affected by this specific pol-
icy reform (Draca et al., 2011). Following Caliendo et al.
(2019), this study relies on the assumption that a higher af-
fectedness to the minimum wage implies a higher effect on
the wages and, therefore, the variable of interest in this pa-
per––the profitability.
The SES dataset defines the treatment and control
groups, which allows for the calculation of the share of
workers who earned less than the introduced wage floor of
€ 8.50 on an industry level. This share of eligible workers
for the minimum wage in a specific industry is used for the
“bite measure” and can be seen as the level of affectedness
an industry faced.
The analysis uses two different definitions of the bite. The
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first definition considers the bite as a continuous variable fol-
lowing recent studies (see e.g. Draca et al., 2011, Harasz-
tosi & Lindner, 2019, Link, 2019, Fedorets & Filatov, 2018).
Therefore, the continuous bite measure is very straight for-
ward and only reflected by the share of eligible workers for
the minimum wage in industry i. The second definition fol-
lows the traditional DiD approach and uses a binary bite mea-
sure. To obtain a binary variable of the exposure of an in-
dustry, this thesis follows previous studies such as Schmitz
(2017) or Caliendo et al. (2017) to calculate the average
share of workers eligible for the minimum wage over all in-
dustries that are available in the 2014 SES survey. Industries
with a treatment intensity that equals or exceeds the average
bite are considered as “exposed” to the minimum wage and
are part of the treatment group; industries with a bite below
the average treatment intensity form the control group and
are considered “not exposed”. Instead of using regional dif-
ferences in the bite like Schmitz (2017), this analysis uses
industry differences in the treatment intensity as an exoge-
neous variation. The DiD approach is applied by using spec-
ifications of the equation in (1) and (2) which follows the
previous studies of Bossler et al. (2018).
Yi t = β1 × FAi + β2 × Dummy2015t +δ(FAi × Dummy
2015
t )
+ θi + γt + εi t
(1)
Yi t = β1 × Ex pi + β2 × Dummy2015t +δ(Ex pi × Dummy
2015
t )
+ θi + γt + εi t
(2)
Equation (1) measures the effect on the outcome vari-
able Yi t with a continuous bite, the fraction affected vari-
able (FAi). In equation (1), the calculated share of workers
earning less than the minimum wage is used as treatment
intensity. Contrarily, the regression in equation (2) is based
on the binary definition of the treatment and control group,
meaning Ex pi , standing for exposed, is a binary variable that
equals 1 if the treatment intensity in industry i exceeds the
average treatment intensity and is 0 otherwise. In the anal-
ysis of this paper, the outcome variable Yi t refers to the EBT
to Revenue ratio. However, the interpretations of the coeffi-
cients do not change in (1) and (2). Dummy2015t is a dummy
variable which is 1 for every time period after 2015, whereas
2015 is included. The use of FAi or Ex pi as explanatory vari-
able controls for differences among industries that already
existed before the introduction of the nationwide wage floor.
Additionally, including the dummy to reflect the fact that if
data is pre- or post-reform measures industry-independent
time effects. Besides, a significant negative coefficient of the
dummy would mean that regardless of the industry, profit
margins decreased for years after the policy reform. To es-
timate the causal effect, the coefficient δ of the interaction
term between the treatment intensity and the time dummy
is of main interest in the DiD analysis. This coefficient shows
how the dependent variable Yi t , here the profit margin, de-
veloped differently over the time of the underlying panel
dataset in highly affected (in terms of the continuous bite
definition) or exposed (in terms of the binary bite definition)
industries, compared to their less affected or non-exposed
counterparts. Thus, this difference is causally interpreted as
a response to the introduction of the minimum wage (Bossler
et al., 2018, Stock & Watson, 2015).
Unfortunately, due to the aggregation of the data used in
this thesis, controlling for individual firm-specific character-
istics or other individual effects is hardly possible. To account
for this fact, this paper uses the fixed effects model (FE) as a
common model in panel data analysis. Furthermore, it uses
a random model (RE) as well as a time fixed effects (TFE)
model. This is done for two main reasons: first, using a FE
and TFE model specification partly accounts for the fact that
no other control variables are included. Second, it allows for
the identification of differences in the result depending on
which model specification is used. Thus, if the results are
similar, it is more likely that they do not depend on the spe-
cific model used but, instead, are rather robust.
The FE model accounts for a common problem in regres-
sion analysis: the omitted variable bias (OVB) problem that
is caused when a variable in the error term is correlated with
an explanatory variable and explains the dependent variable.
To account for this problem, control variables are normally
included. The FE model in this underlying panel data regres-
sion model, however, allows for correlation between unob-
served characteristics about the industries that do not change
over time therefore, they are “fixed”. To specify, θi in the
above stated equations measures the industry specific effects
which do not vary over time. The TFE model is similar to the
FE model, whereas it controls for unobserved heterogeneity
that changes over time, but it does not vary across indus-
tries. The above stated equations represent a fixed effects
model with time fixed effects as well; however, this thesis will
present the results for various specifications of these equa-
tions, such as only a FE model, a random effects (RE) model
that does neither include θi nor γt , as well as the FE and RE
model with time fixed effects (Stock & Watson, 2015).
7.2. Assumptions
As in every economic model, applying the Difference-in-
Difference approach underlies some key assumptions. Fol-
lowing Schmitz (2017) and Bossler et al. (2018), there are
three main assumptions that must apply to be able to inter-
pret the results as causal effects: Common Trend Assump-
tion, Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, and Definition
of Treatment and Control Groups.
a) Common Trend Assumption (CTA) The CTA means,
that in an absence of a certain policy reform, both
groups would have developed similarly. Therefore,
if a general nationwide German minimum wage had
not been introduced in 2015, the pre-tax profit to rev-
enue ratio would have been on a parallel trend across
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highly affected and less-affected industries (Schmitz,
2017). Thus, an identified difference can be causally
interpreted as a result of the policy reform––the mini-
mum wage––that was introduced. Due to the fact that
the DiD approach is a quasi-experiment, this assump-
tion can unfortunately not be directly tested. As the
minimum wage was introduced, it is not possible to
determine what would have happened without this
specific labor market reform. However, one might look
at pre-minimum wage data to determine how profit
margins developed in the treatment and the control
group (Schmitz, 2017). Additionally, the CTA is often
tested by applying placebo regressions. This study fol-
lows previous research in the minimum wage field that
apply a DiD approach (e.g. Mayneris et al., 2018, Ha-
rasztosi & Lindner, 2019, Draca et al., 2011, Garloff,
2016) and conducts placebo regressions in section 9
to reduce the possibility of a violation of the Common
Trend Assumption.
b) Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) The
SUTVA generally means that there are no interdepen-
dencies between the treatment and the control group.
In other words, the minimum wage only affects the
treatment group. Furthermore, the assumption for the
use of a continuous bite measure is slightly different as
it requires industries with a smaller bite to be propor-
tionally less affected (Schmitz, 2017). This assumption
is not as trivial as it seems and can easily be violated
in the medium to the long-term, namely through spill-
over effects that cause interdependencies between the
treatment and the control group (Bossler et al., 2018,
Bossler & Gerner, 2016). Assuming affected and non-
affected industries are not generally related, a policy
reform might as well affect the control group. Assum-
ing firms with a very high treatment intensity (bite
measure) increase their prices5 to account for higher
labor costs and the end market is competitive, this price
increase also affects firms that are part of the con-
trol group. Due to the price increase of their competi-
tors, non-affected firms are likely to sell more of their
products if consumers are able to substitute the prod-
ucts of an exposed firm with similar goods of a non-
exposed firm. Through spillover effects, this specific
non-exposed firm now meets a higher demand than in
the absence of the minimum wage; thus, there might
be a situation where firms in the control group are still
affected by the minimum wage. This example might
be generally possible, but it is unlikely to happen in the
model specification of this paper due to the fact that the
analyzed data is highly aggregated and on the indus-
try level. Substituting the same product with that of a
5See for example Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) who find a significant
increase in prices for consumers in their analysis of the Hungarian labor mar-
ket reform. Link (2019) showed that in the German case, more affected firms
are more likely to increase their prices. Thus, the above stated assumption
is likely to be met.
firm in another industry is not realistic. Another exam-
ple for a positive spillover effect that follows Bossler et
al. (2018) would be the possibility of an effect on the
control group if treated firms react on the minimum
wage with a lower output and job cuts.
Nevertheless, the SUTV assumption is unlikely to be
violated in the study of this thesis due to two main rea-
sons. First, these spillover effects need time and do
not play a remarkable role in the short-term analysis
of this thesis (Schmitz, 2017). Second, previous re-
search about the German minimum wage did not find
wage spillovers, which at least excludes the probabil-
ity of spillovers through wages (Caliendo et al., 2017,
Link, 2019).
c) Definition of the treatment and the control group This
assumption requires a proper definition of the treat-
ment and the control groups to avoid an estimation
bias in the variable of interest. That is specifically rele-
vant as the coefficient of interest in this study––DiD––is
the interaction term of the treatment intensity and the
time dummy. An incorrect estimation of the treat-
ment intensity would lead to a bias in the coefficient of
the interaction term, which is of our main interest in
the Difference-in-Difference approach (Bossler et al.,
2018).
Such a misleading definition of the two groups can be caused
by an anticipating behavior of firms (Bossler et al., 2018).
This might be the case if firms increase their wages before
the 1 January 2015, as firms know that they have to pay
higher wages to their employees who currently earn less than
€ 8.50. However, this can cause a problem if these firms are
treated as control firms only because they are paying wages
equivalent or exceeding the introduced wage floor. Treating
them as a control group can lead to a wrong definition of
the treatment and the control groups as they would not have
been part of the control group without their anticipating be-
havior. This means that firms with the characteristics of low
wage firms will be considered as not affected only because
they anticipated their high degree of affectedness. To account
for that phenomena, Bossler et al. (2018) identify firms with
an anticipating behavior and exclude them from their analy-
sis (Bossler et al., 2018). Unfortunately, this is rarely possible
in the underlying study. Since data is only available on the in-
dustry level and not on the level of individual establishment,
this paper does not account for anticipating effects.
Additionally, using a binary bite measure may result in a
wrong definition of the control and treatment group. Namely,
an exposed industry will include firms that are not affected
by the minimum wage as well as some affected firms are part
of non-exposed industries and thus are in the control group
(Mayneris et al., 2018). To account for that fact, the estima-
tions in this paper present the results for the same regressions
as in (1), which only differ in the definition of the bite mea-
sure (2).
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8. Regression Results and Interpretation
8.1. Results
This section presents the results for the different specifi-
cations of equation (1) and (2) of section 7. For both defini-
tions of the treatment intensity, the results of the four differ-
ent models FE, RE, FE with time fixed effects, and RE with
time fixed effects are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Looking at the results in the continuous model in Table
1, it shows that the bite measure has a negative sign for both
RE model specifications. This was expected, as it shows that
a higher treatment intensity has a negative effect on the in-
dustry’s profit margin. However, this negative effect is not
statistically significant at any common significance level. Sur-
prisingly, the estimation of the main interest in this study, the
DiD coefficient, identifies two interesting facts. On the one
hand, this coefficient has a positive sign, which implies that
highly affected industries profit margins increased after the
minimum wage introduction. This is barely in line with the
former study of Bossler et al. (2018), which finds a significant
decline in firms’ profits due to the German minimum wage.
On the other hand, only the FE with TFE specification gives a
significant effect of the interaction term’s coefficient. Despite
this, Table 1 shows the significant level is only at 10%. As the
results for the interaction term are either not significant or
only at the 10% level, drawing final conclusions from these
results might be too shortsighted. Furthermore, all coeffi-
cients in the continuous model are of similar size, and thus,
the results do not highly depend on the model specification.
In addition to the results of Table 1, looking at Table 2
gives a similar tendency. Similar to the continuous model,
the treatment intensity’s coefficient goes along with a nega-
tive sign. Furthermore, the time dummy for 2015 is for the
FE and RE model negative and is in line with the results from
the continuous model. Nevertheless, none of the two previ-
ously discussed estimates identifies a statistically significant
effect on industries profit margins. The DiD coefficient nei-
ther reveals a significant decrease of profit margins in any
of the four binary model specifications nor is it of a negative
sign. Thus, the general results from the binary model are in
line with the results in Table 1. However, it is remarkable that
every estimation coefficient and standard error in the binary
model is smaller than in the continuous model.
To sum up the results of the Continuous and the Binary
model, either no strong effect or no effect on firms’ profit
margins, as a response to the minimum wage, can be iden-
tified. This result is robust over all model specification be-
tween these two models.
Additionally, the appendix includes further specifications
of equations (1) and (2), namely the same analysis is per-
formed for a log level model and a growth rate model. This
is done to account for a possible dependence of the final re-
sults on the specific model used in the analysis. In line with
the results of Tables 1 and 2, the log level model and the
growth rate model, fail to identify a significant decrease in
firms profit margin as response to the analyzed policy re-
form.6
8.2. Potential threads and limitations
As emphasized in section 8.1, a conclusion claiming that
the German minimum wage had no effects on firms gener-
ally, and no effect on firms profits specifically, might be highly
misleading. At first, the general effect on firms due to the
German minimum wage was not analyzed in this study as its
focus was on firms’ profit margins. Additionally, this paper
does only not identify any significant effects due to multiple
possibilities such as through the limitation of the data used
due to its aggregation and the firms it includes. However,
this should not be seen as a synonym for a nonexistence of
any effect.
To not identify any significant effect, whether increase or
decrease, might be a result of the data used for the analy-
sis. As discussed in section 5, the German Central Bank’s
SSP dataset is very limited. A main concern is the aggrega-
tion of the data, as the SSP data set gives only the results on
the industry level; thus, a firm level analysis that takes the
industries into account is not possible. Another limitation
stems from the firms included in the SSP dataset, which are
mostly large companies than Small and Medium Enterprises.
However, especially small and medium enterprises are higher
affected by the labor market reform in 2015 than large caps.
To specify, an analysis dealing with the interaction of firms
pricing, profitability, and productivity could reveal more re-
alistic and robust results. Mayneris et al. (2018) previously
applied such an analysis to Chinese firms and explained the
nonexistence of a significant decrease in profitability with an
increase in productivity. Nevertheless, a significant increase
in productivity, which can explain the results for the profit
margins, is rather unlikely for the German case. Compared
to China, the German labor market is fully developed, and
additional productivity gains are rather hard to obtain due
to the high level of the status quo level. Additionally, former
researchers that dealt with the minimum wage reform in the
UK (Draca et al., 2011) identified a significant decrease in
profitability. Intuitively, the UK’s economy seems to be of a
higher similarity to the German economy than China’s.
Furthermore, the results in 8.1 do not provide informa-
tion about firms’ profits, but it does give information about
firms’ profit margins defined as the EBT to revenue ratio.
Therefore, a decrease in a firm’s pre-tax earnings does not
necessarily mean a decreasing EBT to revenue ratio. In the
German case, Bruttel (2019) found a significant decrease in
firm’s profits; however, they defined profit as an absolute
number of the difference between revenue and the main costs
and do not consider profitability. Nevertheless, a decrease in
6Note that the same two definitions of the treatment intensity apply to the
log level model and the growth level model. Therefore, in total 16 (4 binary
log level model, 4 continuous log level model, 4 binary growth level model,
4 continuous growth level model) regressions are performed and presented
in the xappendix. The above stated results do not change among different
models or different model specifications.
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Table 1: Profit Margin – Continuous Model
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE RE FE with TFE RE with TFE
Bite 0 -5.745 0 -5.638
(.) (5.777) (.) (4.317)
Dummy 2015 -0.369 -0.331 0.117 0.220
(0.278) (0.288) (0.434) (0.499)
DiD 3.025 2.941 3.368* 3.191
(1.921) (1.991) (1.934) (2.221)
Observations 434 434 434 434
Table 2: Profit Margin – Binary Model
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE RE FE with TFE RE with TFE
Bite 0 -0.886 0 -0.847
(.) (1.394) (.) (1.073)
Dummy 2015 -0.249 -0.204 0.247 0.362
(0.241) (0.253) (0.415) (0.479)
DiD 0.607 0.567 0.646 0.565
(0.444) (0.464) (0.445) (0.513)
Observations 434 434 434 434
absolute profits does not necessarily imply a decreasing prof-
itability.
Generally spoken, firms can adjust their higher labor costs
which are associated with the minimum wage through many
different adjustment channels. Namely, they can reduce the
total hours worked to keep their total labor costs on a similar
level. Additionally, firms can cut or reduce certain non-wage
benefits, or they invest less in the training of their employees
because these trainings are associated with additional costs.
Furthermore, one of the most common responses might be
the increase in prices for their products and services supplied.
Therefore, consumers would primarily pay the introduction
of a minimum wage (Hirsch et al., 2015).7 In previously con-
ducted research regarding the German labor market reform,
Bruttel (2019) identified significant price increases in highly
affected industries. Though, they cannot show a significant
change in labor productivity, other studies (e.g. Bossler &
Boszeit 2017, Pusch & Rehm, 2017) find an increase in job
satisfaction which could be an indicator for the efficiency
wage model. As discussed in section 3, a positive effect on
firms’ profits can exist in the context of the efficiency wage
model.
All these other possible adjustment channels, combined
7See Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) who conclude that mainly consumers
pay for the minimum wage reform in Hungary, instead of firm owner through
lower profits. See section 4 for details.
with the laid-out drawbacks of the dataset that was used,
might be a potential factor for the obtained results in section
8.1 of this thesis.
8.3. Placebo regressions
Since the common trend assumption (CTA) is one of the
key assumptions to interpreting results of the Difference-in-
Difference analysis as causal, this section presents the results
of the performed placebo regressions. As already discussed in
section 7, the CTA cannot be directly tested; however, placebo
regressions test if prior to the minimum wage introduction,
a significant ‘placebo’ effect of the variable of interest took
place. Such a significant placebo effect leads to two conclu-
sions: a parallel trend assumption cannot be verified and is
unlikely, and the estimated results for the analyzed policy
reform cannot be interpreted as causal effect in response to
the policy change (Schmitz, 2017). In this study, placebo re-
gressions for the continuous model and the normal model,
both with its four different specifications, are performed. In
addition, the appendix includes placebo regressions for the
four model specifications of both the log level model as well
as the growth rate model. Summing up the overall results,
the analyses fail to identify significant placebo effects for all
specifications in the log level model, the growth rate model,
and the ‘normal’ continuous model. Contradictorily, the two
fixed effects specification in the ‘normal’ binary model reveal
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a placebo effect at the 10% level. These results do not en-
tirely support the applicability of the CTA in this context.
Thus, the findings shown in section 8 must be interpreted
carefully, as the placebo regressions do not allow to fully
rely on the CTA. Nonetheless, the graphs shown in section
6 give a slightly different conclusion. The graphs show that
since 2010 profitability in exposed and non-exposed indus-
tries has not always been on a common trend; however, this
was clearly the case for the two years prior the implemen-
tation of the minimum wage. Additionally, the control and
the treatment group have developed only slightly different
for the years 2010-2012. Thus, it would be interesting to
apply an adjusted trend assumption to the standard regres-
sions from equation (1) and (2), as previously done in the
context of minimum wage research namely by Bruckmeier
and Becker (2018) or Bossler et al. (2018), to evaluate if
the results would change since the graphical analysis and the
placebo regressions over all models do not provide a clear re-
sult.
9. Discussion and conclusion
Nearly four million workers have been eligible for the
new German minimum wage of € 8.50 per hour. Due to the
high ambiguity of the theoretical effects of minimum wages
on economic aspects––such as employment, poverty, welfare,
firm profits, or consumer’s prices––this study addressed firm’s
profitabilities on the industry level as one major possible ad-
justment channel of firms’ behavior, which is of high rele-
vance for a better understanding of the German minimum
wage.
Surprisingly, this study did not identify a significant de-
cline in firms’ profit margins in highly affected industries as
a response to the minimum wage. Therefore, the results in
this thesis are nearly in line with previous international lit-
erature on profits (Harasztosi & Lindner, 2019), but still in
contrast to Bruttel (2019) review of the effects of the German
minimum wage, as he finds a clear decrease in firms’ profits.
A missing effect in firms’ profits would be in line with the
theoretical monopsony model from section 3; however, the
price increases in Germany (Link, 2019) contradict the ap-
plicability of the monopsony model in the context of the Ger-
man minimum wage. This shows the difficulty in applying a
suitable theoretical model and emphasizes the importance of
empirical research in the field of minimum wage reform. The
results in this thesis are robust over a variation of different
model definitions and model specifications. The performed
robustness checks reveal two specifications for a significant
placebo effect at the 10% level. Combining these results and
the graphs shown in section 6, neither a clear verification of
the CTA can be made, nor an obvious violation can be de-
tected.
Unfortunately, this thesis faced some limitations ac-
cording the availability of the data used to clearly apply a
Difference-in-Difference approach for the German minimum
wage. Therefore, further research can give more enhanced
results in the following way: first, new data points such as for
the years after 2017 may allow for a more robust and reliable
analysis, as currently only the 2 years following the introduc-
tion of the minimum wage (2016 and 2017) are included,
whereas 5 years of pre-reform data is available. Second, a
better understanding of a German firm’s response regarding
to their profitability can be provided by a less aggregated
data set that includes data on the individual firm level, and
additionally provides information for results for each region
and industry. Furthermore, a smaller degree of aggregation
makes it easier to include suitable control variables into the
regression, which may change the results. Many previous
papers focus on specific adjustment channels, such as prices,
employment, or profits; however, due to the high diversity
in the results of these papers, a study such as Mayneris et al.
(2018) that focuses on the interdependencies of firms’ dif-
ferent opportunities to adjust their behavior, such as through
prices, profits, and the productivity could give a deeper un-
derstanding of how all the different factors are influenced
by the German minimum wage. Thus, such a study can also
function as a reliable source for policy makers. Additionally,
in the near future, an evaluation of whether increases to the
German minimum wage (e.g. in 2020 to € 9.34) led to a
significant change in firms’ profit margins can increase the
understanding of firms’ adjustments. One reason might be,
that the first introduction of an hourly wage floor of € 8.50
in 2015 could be primarily passed through consumers, but at
a given––yet unspecified––point, firms and shareholders are
paying for further minimum wage increases with lower prof-
its, as no more price increases are tolerated by consumers.
Thus, further research will allow for an interpretation of
the missing effects on firms’ profit margins in this thesis as it
could answer whether there was no effect because the hourly
wage floor was not high enough or whether insufficient data
led to the underlying results. Indeed, only a joint analysis
can reveal the whole story, which means that a conclusion
stating the implementation of a minimum wage has no effect
on firms’ profitabilities, based on these analyses, could be too
short-sighted.
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